Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
Objects of different quality are to be allocated to agents. Agents can receive at most one object, and there are not enough high-quality objects for every agent.The value to the social planner from allocating objects to any given agent depends on that agent’s private information. The social planner...
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| Materyal Türü: | article |
| Dil: | İngilizce |
| Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: |
2023
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| Konular: | |
| Online Erişim: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/2441 https://doi.org/10.3982/TE5088 |
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