Capital structure under collusion
We analyze the financial leverage of firms that collude to soften product market competition, by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage during collusion periods. This is consistent with the idea that cartel firms strategically reduce leverage to make their cartels more stabl...
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| Autres auteurs: | , , |
| Format: | article |
| Langue: | anglais |
| Publié: |
2021
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| Sujets: | |
| Accès en ligne: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1394 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2020.100854 |
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