Capital structure under collusion
We analyze the financial leverage of firms that collude to soften product market competition, by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage during collusion periods. This is consistent with the idea that cartel firms strategically reduce leverage to make their cartels more stabl...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Other Authors: | , , |
| Format: | article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2021
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1394 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2020.100854 |
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| _version_ | 1868890040429445120 |
|---|---|
| author | Ferrés, Daniel |
| author2 | Ormazabal, Gaizka Povel, Paul Sertsios, Giorgio |
| author2_role | author author author |
| author_browse | Ferrés, Daniel Ormazabal, Gaizka Povel, Paul Sertsios, Giorgio |
| author_facet | Ferrés, Daniel Ormazabal, Gaizka Povel, Paul Sertsios, Giorgio |
| author_role | author |
| collection | REDUM |
| dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv | Ferrés, Daniel. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Ferrés, Daniel Ormazabal, Gaizka Povel, Paul Sertsios, Giorgio |
| dc.date.none.fl_str_mv | 2021 2022-10-05T19:47:38Z 2022-10-05T19:47:38Z |
| dc.format.none.fl_str_mv | application/pdf |
| dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv | 1096-0473 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1394 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2020.100854 |
| dc.language.none.fl_str_mv | eng |
| dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv | Elsevier |
| dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv | Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 45, 100854 |
| dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv | Abierto info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| dc.source.none.fl_str_mv | reponame:REDUM instname:Universidad de Montevideo instacron:Universidad de Montevideo |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv | Capital structure Financial leverage Collusion Cartels |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv | Capital structure under collusion |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | Artículo info:eu-repo/semantics/article Aceptada info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion |
| description | We analyze the financial leverage of firms that collude to soften product market competition, by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage during collusion periods. This is consistent with the idea that cartel firms strategically reduce leverage to make their cartels more stable, because high leverage makes deviations from a cartel agreement more attractive. Given that cartels have a large economic footprint, their study is also relevant for the capital structure literature, which has largely ignored the role of anti-competitive behavior. |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| format | article |
| id | anni_4ce84ffcf8f25a85eaad2003b8975c4d |
| identifier_str_mv | 1096-0473 |
| instacron_str | Universidad de Montevideo |
| institution | Universidad de Montevideo |
| instname_str | Universidad de Montevideo |
| language | eng |
| network_acronym_str | anni |
| network_name_str | oai-lr-anni |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:redum.um.edu.uy:20.500.12806/1394 |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publishDateSort | 2021 |
| publisher.none.fl_str_mv | Elsevier |
| reponame_str | REDUM |
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv | |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv | |
| repository_id_str | |
| rights_invalid_str_mv | Abierto Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| spelling | Capital structure under collusionFerrés, DanielOrmazabal, GaizkaPovel, PaulSertsios, GiorgioCapital structureFinancial leverageCollusionCartelsWe analyze the financial leverage of firms that collude to soften product market competition, by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage during collusion periods. This is consistent with the idea that cartel firms strategically reduce leverage to make their cartels more stable, because high leverage makes deviations from a cartel agreement more attractive. Given that cartels have a large economic footprint, their study is also relevant for the capital structure literature, which has largely ignored the role of anti-competitive behavior.ElsevierFerrés, Daniel. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay2022-10-05T19:47:38Z2022-10-05T19:47:38Z2021Artículoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleAceptadainfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdf1096-0473https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1394https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2020.100854reponame:REDUMinstname:Universidad de Montevideoinstacron:Universidad de MontevideoengJournal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 45, 100854Abiertoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacionalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/oai:redum.um.edu.uy:20.500.12806/13942026-06-16T07:01:47Z |
| spellingShingle | Capital structure under collusion Ferrés, Daniel Capital structure Financial leverage Collusion Cartels |
| status_str | acceptedVersion |
| title | Capital structure under collusion |
| title_full | Capital structure under collusion |
| title_fullStr | Capital structure under collusion |
| title_full_unstemmed | Capital structure under collusion |
| title_short | Capital structure under collusion |
| title_sort | Capital structure under collusion |
| topic | Capital structure Financial leverage Collusion Cartels |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1394 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2020.100854 |