Property rights, sick pay and effort supply
Direct evidence on variations in work incentives across different property rights systems remains scarce. This paper examines absenteeism among individuals employed in worker cooperatives—firms that are ultimately controlled by their workforce. By leveraging employment data matched with sick leave r...
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| מחברים אחרים: | , |
| פורמט: | article |
| שפה: | אנגלית |
| יצא לאור: |
2025
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| נושאים: | |
| גישה מקוונת: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/50604 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2025.103533. |
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| _version_ | 1868890219016617984 |
|---|---|
| author | Blanchard, Pablo |
| author2 | Burdín, Gabriel Dean, Andrés |
| author2_role | author author |
| author_browse | Blanchard, Pablo Burdín, Gabriel Dean, Andrés |
| author_facet | Blanchard, Pablo Burdín, Gabriel Dean, Andrés |
| author_role | author |
| collection | COLIBRI |
| dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv | Blanchard Pablo, Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía Burdín Gabriel, Università degli Studi di Siena Dean Andrés, Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía |
| dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv | Uruguay |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Blanchard, Pablo Burdín, Gabriel Dean, Andrés |
| dc.date.none.fl_str_mv | 2025-07-14T19:40:47Z 2025-07-14T19:40:47Z 2025 |
| dc.format.none.fl_str_mv | 18 p. application/pdf |
| dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv | BLANCHARD, Pablo, BURDÍN, Gabriel y DEAN, AndréS. Property rights, sick pay and effort supply, Journal of Development Economics, vol. 177, 2025, 103533, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2025.103533. https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/50604 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2025.103533. |
| dc.language.none.fl_str_mv | en eng |
| dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv | Elsevier |
| dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv | Journal of Development Economics, vol. 177, 2025,103533. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2025.103533. |
| dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Licencia Creative Commons Atribución (CC - By 4.0) |
| dc.source.none.fl_str_mv | reponame:COLIBRI instname:Universidad de la República instacron:Universidad de la República |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv | Effort Moral hazard Cooperatives Property rights Absenteeism Sick pay COOPERATIVAS AUSENTISMO |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv | Property rights, sick pay and effort supply |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | Artículo info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
| description | Direct evidence on variations in work incentives across different property rights systems remains scarce. This paper examines absenteeism among individuals employed in worker cooperatives—firms that are ultimately controlled by their workforce. By leveraging employment data matched with sick leave records and reform-induced variation in the generosity of Uruguay’s statutory sick pay, we find that absenteeism differentially increased for individuals affected by the policy change and employed in cooperatives. The effect is driven by co-op members, hard-to-diagnose (and, hence, more prone to moral hazard reporting problems) musculoskeletal conditions and large cooperatives. Conventional firms used dismissals more intensely than cooperatives as a threat to keep absenteeism in check after the reform. |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| format | article |
| id | anni_e5dfb1f3d76fe0c5a4f31e6c2e795363 |
| identifier_str_mv | BLANCHARD, Pablo, BURDÍN, Gabriel y DEAN, AndréS. Property rights, sick pay and effort supply, Journal of Development Economics, vol. 177, 2025, 103533, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2025.103533. |
| instacron_str | Universidad de la República |
| institution | Universidad de la República |
| instname_str | Universidad de la República |
| language | eng |
| language_invalid_str_mv | en |
| network_acronym_str | anni |
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| oai_identifier_str | oai:colibri.udelar.edu.uy:20.500.12008/50604 |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| publishDateSort | 2025 |
| publisher.none.fl_str_mv | Elsevier |
| reponame_str | COLIBRI |
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv | |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv | |
| repository_id_str | |
| rights_invalid_str_mv | Licencia Creative Commons Atribución (CC - By 4.0) |
| spelling | Property rights, sick pay and effort supplyBlanchard, PabloBurdín, GabrielDean, AndrésEffortMoral hazardCooperativesProperty rightsAbsenteeismSick payCOOPERATIVASAUSENTISMODirect evidence on variations in work incentives across different property rights systems remains scarce. This paper examines absenteeism among individuals employed in worker cooperatives—firms that are ultimately controlled by their workforce. By leveraging employment data matched with sick leave records and reform-induced variation in the generosity of Uruguay’s statutory sick pay, we find that absenteeism differentially increased for individuals affected by the policy change and employed in cooperatives. The effect is driven by co-op members, hard-to-diagnose (and, hence, more prone to moral hazard reporting problems) musculoskeletal conditions and large cooperatives. Conventional firms used dismissals more intensely than cooperatives as a threat to keep absenteeism in check after the reform.ElsevierBlanchard Pablo, Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de EconomíaBurdín Gabriel, Università degli Studi di SienaDean Andrés, Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía2025-07-14T19:40:47Z2025-07-14T19:40:47Z2025Artículoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion18 p.application/pdfBLANCHARD, Pablo, BURDÍN, Gabriel y DEAN, AndréS. Property rights, sick pay and effort supply, Journal of Development Economics, vol. 177, 2025, 103533, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2025.103533.https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/50604https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2025.103533.reponame:COLIBRIinstname:Universidad de la Repúblicainstacron:Universidad de la RepúblicaenengJournal of Development Economics, vol. 177, 2025,103533. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2025.103533.UruguayLas obras depositadas en el Repositorio se rigen por la Ordenanza de los Derechos de la Propiedad Intelectual de la Universidad de la República.(Res. Nº 91 de C.D.C. de 8/III/1994 – D.O. 7/IV/1994) y por la Ordenanza del Repositorio Abierto de la Universidad de la República (Res. Nº 16 de C.D.C. de 07/10/2014)info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLicencia Creative Commons Atribución (CC - By 4.0)oai:colibri.udelar.edu.uy:20.500.12008/506042026-04-14T10:40:21Z |
| spellingShingle | Property rights, sick pay and effort supply Blanchard, Pablo Effort Moral hazard Cooperatives Property rights Absenteeism Sick pay COOPERATIVAS AUSENTISMO |
| status_str | publishedVersion |
| title | Property rights, sick pay and effort supply |
| title_full | Property rights, sick pay and effort supply |
| title_fullStr | Property rights, sick pay and effort supply |
| title_full_unstemmed | Property rights, sick pay and effort supply |
| title_short | Property rights, sick pay and effort supply |
| title_sort | Property rights, sick pay and effort supply |
| topic | Effort Moral hazard Cooperatives Property rights Absenteeism Sick pay COOPERATIVAS AUSENTISMO |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/50604 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2025.103533. |