Can political gridlock undermine checks and balances? A lab experiment
If checks and balances are aimed at protecting citizens from the government’s abuse of power, why do they sometimes weaken them? We address this question in a laboratory experiment in which subjects choose between two decision rules: with and without checks and balances. Voters may prefer an uncheck...
保存先:
| 第一著者: | |
|---|---|
| その他の著者: | , |
| フォーマット: | article |
| 言語: | 英語 |
| 出版事項: |
2024
|
| 主題: | |
| オンライン･アクセス: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/2440 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2023.102128 |
| タグ: |
タグなし, このレコードへの初めてのタグを付けませんか!
|
| 要約: | If checks and balances are aimed at protecting citizens from the government’s abuse of power, why do they sometimes weaken them? We address this question in a laboratory experiment in which subjects choose between two decision rules: with and without checks and balances. Voters may prefer an unchecked executive if that enables a reform that, otherwise, is blocked by the legislature. Consistent with our predictions, we find that subjects are more likely to weaken checks and balances when there is political gridlock. However, subjects weaken the controls not only when the reform is beneficial but also when it is harmful. |
|---|