The regulatory choice of noncompliance in the lab: effect on quantities, prices, and implications for the design of a cost-effective policy
Recent theoretical developments show the conditions under which it is cost-effective for the regulator to induce perfect compliance in cap-and-trade programs. These conditions are based on the ability that a regulator with perfect information has to induce the firms to emit any desired level with di...
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| Format: | article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2016
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/2445 https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2014-0202 |
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