Nash equilibrium in evolutionary competitive models of firms and workers under external regulation

The object of this paper is to study the labor market using evolutionary game theory as a framework. The entities of this competitive model are firms and workers, with and without external regulation. Firms can either innovate or not, while workers can either be skilled or not. Under the most simple...

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Bibliographic Details

Main Author:	Accinelli, Elvio (author)
Other Authors:	Bazzano, Bruno (author), Robledo, Franco (author), Romero, Pablo (author)
Format:	report
Language:	English
Published:	2014
Subjects:	Poverty trap External regulator Nash equilibrium Replicators dynamics Stochastic dynamics
Online Access:	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/5168
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